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RECENT CASES

issue presented in the instant case, it has considered three related
problems. In one case,4 the court found an ineffective w a i v e r
because of the "unconscionable haste" with which the nineteen year
old defendant was sentenced for murder.4 5 An effective waiver was
found however, where an eighteen year old claimed his plea of guilty
had been influenced by promises of a lighter sentence. 46 In State v.
Jackman,'47 the most recent case considered by the court in this
area, it found an effective waiver because of the defendant's prior
experience with criminal proceedings even though the twenty year
old defendant claimed he thought he was waiving counsel in juvenile
and not criminal proceedings. The intimation from these decisions,
particularly the Jackman decision' 8 is that when the issue is presented to the court it will follow the more favorable majority view
set out herein rather than base its decision solely on the age of
the defendant.
CARLTON JAMES HUNKE
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SETTLEMENTS-Under a property settlement agreement the wife was
to transfer and release any and all interest in certain policies
on her divorced husband's life in which she was the named beneficiary. The agreement further provided that the insured was given
the right to designate beneficiaries and to exclude the wife if he
so desired. The insured made no attempt to change the beneficiary
and died six months after the final divorce decree. The Supreme
Court of Arkansas, three justices dissenting, held that the divorced
wife was foreclosed to claim any interest in or proceeds from the
policies in light of the specific transfer to the decedent. The dissenting justices reasoned that the provision in the settlement
providing for a change of beneficiary "if the insured so desired,"
should be given effect when considered with his inaction, and that
this clearly indicated a desire not to exclude the divorced wife
as named beneficiary. Brewer v. Brewer, 390 S.W.2d 630 (Ark.

1965).
This case exemplifies one of the p r o b I e m s with which the
courts have struggled when determining the effect of p r o p e r t y
settlement agreements on the right to proceeds of a life insurance
policy. Although not considered in most cases, there is some con44. State v. Magrum, 76 N.D. 527, 38 N.W.2d 358 (1949).
45. Note that under our classification this decision really Involves a finding that the
defendant was not advised of his right to have counsel; see supra note 7.
46. State ex rel Johnson v. Broderick, 75 ND. 340, 27 N.W.2d 849 (1947).
47. 93 N.W.2d 425 (N.D. 1958),
48. See, Id at 429.

380

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

cern as to whether allowing such an agreement to effect a change
of beneficiary would be doing so in a mode not authorized by the
insurer.' Most of the decisions have disregarded this aspect, however, and have determined the rights of the parties involved on
the basis of other considerations.2
Early cases held that divorce a 1 o n e did not terminate the
named beneficiary's interest in the proceeds of an insurance policy
on the divorced spouse's life.3 In the absence of statute, such is
the general rule at present.4 Those courts considering the effect
of property settlement agreements on the right to proceeds have
taken divergent views, however, by considering the position of the
particular parties involved. Some courts have held that the named
beneficiary does not give up her right to proceeds by entering
into such an agreement,5 while others have held that the right
to proceeds is lost by any provision in which the named beneficiary
w a i v e s her rights to the husband's property. 8 Another line of
decisions takes the position that whether or not the named beneficiary loses her interest, depends on the language of the property
settlement or the particular facts of the case.7
The instant case, by adopting the view that a specific release
of the policies should foreclose the wife's interest, is concurring
in the result of the better reasoned decisions holding that the
particular language of the p r o p e r t y settlement, as well as the
circumstances of the parties, should be considered.8 Although the
instant case reaches an equitable result, the majority rely on rather
weak authority within their own jurisdiction9 and cite none of the
cases arising elsewhere. It should be noted that Arkansas allows
a change of beneficiary by testamentary provision.10 This w a s
relied on in deciding an earlier case involving the named beneficiary's right to proceeds,' which case is in part the basis of the
court's decision here.
Those jurisdictions having statutory provisions regarding the
1.
2.

E.g., John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Dawson, 278 S.W.2d
E.g., Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Bushnell, 190 F. Supp. 499 (D

57 (Mo. App. 1955).
Wyo. 1960) (Court

reasoned that requirements for changing beneficiary come into play only when there are
acts toward changing beneficiary) ; Western & So. Life Ins. Co. v. Hague, 74 Ohio L. Abs.
259, 140 N.E.2d 89 (C.P. 1956) (Separation agreement deemed effective in itself to bar
the wife from claiming the proceeds).
3.
Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, 94 U.S. 457 (1876) ; Overhiser's Adm'x

v.

Overhiser, 63 Ohio St. 77, 57 N.E. 965 (1900').
4.
E.g., Cannon v. Hamilton, 174 Ohio St. 268,
SURANCE § 116 (3d ed. 1951).

5.

E.g., Parrish v. Kaska, 204 F.2d 451

Ins. Co. v.

6.

Soluri, 134 F.

Supp. 86

189 N.E.2d 152

(1963) ; VANCE,

IN-

(10th Cir. 1953) ; John Hancock Mut. Life

(S.D. N.Y. 1955).

E.G., O'Brien v. Elder, 250 F.2d 275 (5th Cir. 1957) ; Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Bushnell. supra note 2.
7. E.g., Baekgaard v. Carrelro, 237 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1956 (Language of the settlement was the determining factor) ; Thorp v. Randazzo, 41 Cal. Rep. 2d 770, 264 P.2d 38
(1953) (held against the named beneficiary saying that each case should be decided on
Its particular facts).
8. Supra note 7.
9. Roman v. Smith, 228 Ark 833, 314 S.W.2d 225 (1958) (Constructive trust imposed
on proceeds of a U.S. savings bond held by the wife; property settlement had given the
bond to the husband but the wife was still named beneficiary).
10. Clements v. Neblett 237 Ark. 340, 372 S.W.2d 816 (1963); Pedron v. Olds, 193
Ark. 1026, 105 S.W.2d 70 ?1937).
11. Mabbitt v. Wilkerson, 220 Ark 270, 247 S.W.2d 201 (1952).
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wife's interest upon divorce 12 seem to have had the least difficulty
with the problem. The Michigan statute,1 8 for example, provides
that the wife's interest as named beneficiary is terminated upon
divorce unless otherwise provided in the divorce decree. The other
statutes are not as explicit, but a similar result has been attained
by judicial interpretation. " With the seemingly increased use and
importance of property settlement agreements, such a legislative
resolution of the problem before it arises might be the best course
for North Dakota to follow. A properly drafted statute could insure
certainty of result, and yet be flexible enough to allow the parties
to provide otherwise if such would fit their situation.
It is this writer's opinion that the better view is provided by
those cases that base their decisions on the particular language
of the settlement and on other facts because a flexibility of result
can be attained that would otherwise be lacking. In a situation
where the wife has specifically waived her interest in the policy,
the reasonable conclusion to be drawn is that both she and the
insured have intended that this waiver be effective. It should further
be recognized that the problem in these cases is not an actual
changing of beneficiary, but rather a determination of the right
to proceeds. This being so, a provision whereby the beneficiary
expressly and specifically waives rights to the proceeds should be
given effect and the party should thereafter be foreclosed from
claiming any right to such proceeds.
Such a result might be said to effect a change of beneficiary
in a mode not generally authorized by the insurer. This should
make little difference, however, in that the requirements for changing a beneficiary are intended to protect the insurer against having
to pay twice on the death of the insured, 15 and if the insurer
need only pay once, as is the case in interpleader actions, he will
not be prejudiced.
In light of the seeming absence of case law in North Dakota,
we are free to approach this problem unfettered by the stricture
of prior decisions. If a case involving similar facts should arise,
this decision and others so holding would provide a certain and
preferable view to follow in this confused area of the law.
GARYLLE STEWART

12.
Ky. REV. STAT. § 403.060 (1962) ; MICH. COMP. LAWS § 552.101 (1948); WIS.
STAT. ANN. §§ 246.11 & 247.26 (1957).
13.
MicH. ComP. LAWS, supra note 12 (The insurer is protected by this statute also and
is liable for paying according to the terms of the policy only if he pays after receiving
notice of the divorce from some interested party).
14.
See, e.g., Salisbury v. Vick, 368 S.W.2d 317 (Ct. App. Ky 1963); Spalding v.
Williams, 275 Wis. 394, 82 N.W.2d 187 (1957).
15. Mabbitt v. Wilkerson, supra note 11; see generally, VANCE, INSURANCE §§ 108-110

(3d ed. 1951).

